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This paper explores the micro-foundations of public policy over environmental protection
in developing economies by examining individual-level preferences for economically costly
pollution abatement. The paper empirically investigates individuals’ “marginal willingness
to pay” (MWTP) for stronger environmental protection, analyzing nearly 24,000 survey
responses, from 24 developing economies, to environmental questions from the 2005-2008
wave of the World Values Survey. I analyze the probability that an individual states she is
WTP for further environmental protection depending on her individual-level characteristics
and her country’s characteristics. The main results to emerge from the analysis include:
(i) perceived environmental problems that are local do not determine MWTP , where as
perceived problems that are global do, (ii) self-identiﬁcation as a “world citizen” is the
strongest determinant of demand for greater environmental protection, indicating that
motivation to contribute to a “global public good” is not a strictly post-material notion,
and (iii) the primary determinants of MWTP are not qualitatively different from those
among respondents in advanced economies. The results pose a challenge to the “objective
problems, subjective values” response to the critique of the post-materialism hypothesis. It
appears that the WTP for environmental protection in developing economies follows from
subjective values that are universal, rather than from objective problems.
Keywords: Environmental protection policy, Political preferences, Global public goods,
World Values Survey, Developing economies
JEL Codes: Q52, Q56, Q58
Alternative Title: Objective Problems, Universal Values: Willingness to Pay for Environmen-
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11 Introduction
One of the most cited notions in environmental economics is that environmental degrada-
tion is the price of industrialization. As societies move from agrarian to urbanized industrial
economies, environmental damage increases. It is often argued that industrialization contin-
ues until the level where the society is rich enough to forgo further industrial development
and begin to pay heed to the environment. The relation between environmental degradation
and national income may follow an inverted-U pattern, as richer countries begin demanding
environmental protection and transition to more service-oriented, post-industrial economies.
The notion is the foundation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature.1 Poor countries
are willing to chose industrialization over environmental protection because they value higher
incomes more than environmental quality on the margin; rich countries are willing to forgo
further industrialization, either because they can afford it (due to larger budget sets and dimin-
ishing marginal utility of income/consumption) or because they have transitioned to a cleaner
post-industrial economic structure.
Economists and sociologists have traditionally treated environmental protection as a nor-
mal good, the demand for which increases as income increases along the development path
[Baumol and Oates (1979), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), Diekmann and Franzen (1999),
Franzen and Meyer (2010)]. Furthermore, as with most goods, there may be diminishing
marginal utility to environmental protection [McConnell (1997), Israel and Levinson (2004)].
Rationalizing why environmental protection is a normal good has been more difﬁcult. The
post-materialist hypothesis, for example, posits that environmental protection is greater in ad-
vanced economies because individuals’ budget constraints for necessary commodities are no
longer binding. Freed from the grind of sustenance, individuals in richer economies can fo-
cus their attention on “post-material” pursuits, such as environmental protection [Ingelhart
(1971), Ingelhart (1995), Martínez-Alier (1995)]. This view has been disputed due to the ob-
servation that concern for the environment is not limited to individuals in advanced economies.
Depending on the measure, concern for the environment is often found to be stronger in devel-
oping economies. Indeed, environmentalism may be a “globalization phenomenon” [Brechin
and Kempton (1994), Dunlap and Mertig (1995), Dunlap and Mertig (1997), Gelisson (2007)].
In response to the “globalization phenomenon” critique of the post-materialist hypothesis,
Ingelhart (1997) puts forward the “subjective values, objective problems” hypothesis. In this
view, demand for environmental protection in developing economies follows the necessity to
1Grossman and Krueger (1993) were the ﬁrst to describe the inverted-U pattern as an “environmental Kuznets
curve,” due to the similar relation between income inequality and national pe capita income along the develop-
ment path [citation needed]. See Dasgupta et al. (2002), Copeland and Taylor (2004), and Stern (2004) for
reviews of this literature.
2overcome objective local environmental problems, such as lack of access to adequate sanitation
or lack of clean drinking water. The advanced economies, on the other hand, free from the
burden of local environmental problems, must be demanding environmental protection for
reasons justiﬁed by their subjective values.2
This paper challenges the notion that the WTP for environmental protection in develop-
ing countries is due to local “objective environmental problems”. I examine local and global
environmental determinants of the WTP for further environmental protection. If the objec-
tive problems explanation is correct, then local concerns should be a stronger determinant
than global concerns, all else equal, since objectivity of the problem is directly related to the
problem’s relative locality. I ﬁnd that this is not the case. The ideals described by the term
“subjective values” drive MWTP in developing economies as well. Moreover, subjective values
seem to be stronger determinants of MWTP than are objective problems. In this sense, devel-
oping economies are not qualitatively different than advanced economies.3 Subjective values
concerning the environment appeal to be universal, rather than post-material.
I consider individual-level survey responses from the 2005-2008 wave of the World Val-
ues Survey (WVS) [World Values Survey Association (2009)]. The question of paramount
interest, which approximates the respondents’ “willingness-to-pay” for greater environmen-
tal protection, was asked in 24 countries classiﬁed by the IMF as “developing economies”, to
nearly 26,000 respondents. The WVS also provides information on the respondents’ relative
incomes, education levels, attitudes about local and global environmental problems, attitudes
about levels of citizenship, trust in government, and post-materialistic ideals. In addition, I
have gathered various country-level characteristics from the myriad of data sources compiled
in the Quality of Government database [Teorell et al. (2010)], including components of the
Environmental Performance Index score [Etsy, D. et al. (2008)], national income per capita
[United Nations Statistics Division, Economics Statistics Branch (2009)], and the widely-used
polit y score of democratic institutional quality [Marshall and Jaggers (2002)]. The sam-
ple pools individual-level WVS responses across countries and includes the aforementioned
country-level effects.
The dependent variables in the regression analysis are converted into binary variables, so
probit estimations are employed. The empirical analysis includes regressions on the full sam-
2In the developed world, there is evidence that willingness to pay of environmental protection is driven by
values, rather than economics [Frey (1999)]. See Bornstein and Lanz (2008) for evidence from Switzerland. Else-
where in the economics literature, see Tjernstöm and Tietenberg (2008) for a study of 26 developed economies,
Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas (2007) for a focus on the Spanish data, and Vatn (2005) for an emphasis on the role
of political institutions. More generally, see Sen (1977) and Meier (2006) on the role of pro-social motivations to
voluntarily contribute to public goods.
3The magnitude of the effects of subjective values are in some cases smaller in developing economies than in
advanced economies, however.
3ple of 24 developing economies, as well as sub-sample regressions on the surveyed countries
with the worst access to adequate sanitation.4 Additionally, I include advanced economies in
the pooled sample to test whether the determinants of MWTP are systematically different in
developing economies. Furthermore, I have preformed within-country estimations for each of
the 24 developing countries and analyze how the factors that determine willingness to pay for
environmental protection differ depending on the development level of the economy and the
quality of democratic institutions.
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 introduces the data and gives an
overview of the econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the econometric results and
Section 4 concludes brieﬂy.
2 Data description
2.1 Dependent variables
The three dependent variables I consider describe individuals’ “marginal willingness to pay”
(MWTP) for additional environmental protection in their country. In 24 countries classiﬁed by
the IMF as developing economies5, respondents from the 2005-2008 wave of the WVS were
asked if they agree with the following statement:
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to
prevent environmental pollution.
The responses were used to create a binary dependent variable, wtpinc = 1 if the respondent
strongly agreed or agreed and wtpinc = 0 if the respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement.
Respondents were asked if they would support higher tax rates to ﬁnance environmental
protection, i.e., if they agree with the following statement:
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent
environmental pollution.
4The sub-sample includes the 12 countries where less than 75 percent of the population has access to adequate
sanitation. Robustness checks will include running the regressions using linear probability models (done), running
ordered probit estimations on the raw, ordinal data, and re-running the probit estimations with alternative binary
dependent variables, constructed using different cut-off points for the binary dependent variables.
5Table 2 lists the 24 countries. Andorra and Cyprus, which are listed as the IMF as developing economies,
were participants in the 2005-2008 wave of the WVS. These two countries are dropped from the pooled sample
because they are substantially richer than the rest of the countries in the sample. Andorra and Cyprus had 2002
per capita GDP of 23581.01 and 13437.93, respectively, while the next richest country had 2002 per capita GDP
of 6706.43, measured in 1990 U.S. dollars. The results are qualitatively similar if Andorra and Cyrpus are left in
the pooled sample, and are available upon request.
4The second binary dependent variable is similarly constructed, wtptax = 1 if the respondent
strongly agreed or agreed and wtptax = 0 if the respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement.
Finally, respondents were asked which of the following statements is closer to their own
point of view:
1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower
economic growth and some loss of jobs.
2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the
environment suffers to some extent.
The binary variable wtpgrowth = 1 if the respondent’s own view is closer to the ﬁrst state-
ment and wtpgrowth = 0 if it is closer to the second statement. The three dependent variables
get at marginal willingness to pay, since there is already some level of environmental protec-
tion present, in all countries. Assuming that utility is diminishing on the margin, the empirical
results conﬁrm that respondents are thinking in marginal terms. The proportion of respon-
dents answering “yes” is lower in countries that have relatively higher levels of environmental
protection, using components of the EPI to control for the level of environmental protection in
place.
2.2 Independent variables
2.2.1 Individual-level explanatory variables
All individual-level explanatory variables are taken from the 2005-2008 wave of the World Val-
ues Survey. The responses to questions about perceived environmental problems are the main
explanatory variables. They were constructed as binary variables, taking value 1 if the respon-
dent felt the problem was “very serious”. The ﬁrst three are local environmental problems:
water_prob inquires about poor water quality, air_prob about poor air quality, and aas_prob
about poor sewage and sanitation. The expected sign on the coefﬁcients of all three of these
variables is positive. The last three are regional/global environmental problems: bio_prob
asks about loss of plant/animal biodiversity, lake_prob about pollution of lakes and oceans,
and global_prob about global warming or the greenhouse effect. Again, the coefﬁcients on
all three of these variables is expected to be positive. Greater perception of environmental
problems should be associated with a greater willingness to pay for environmental protection,
all else equal. There is, however, an interesting caveat. If the “objective problems” characteri-
zation of the demand for environmental protection is correct, then we should observe that the
5impacts of local environmental problems on WTP is stronger in magnitude than those of global
environmental problems.
Second, there are two citizenship questions: worldcit = 1 if the respondent agreed or
strongly agreed that they see themselves as a world citizen and localcit = if the respondent
strongly agreed that they see themselves as a citizen of their local community. Identiﬁcation
as a citizen at either level is expected to have a positive effect on the willingness to pay for
environmental protection. Again, however, the caveat is that the “objective problems” hypoth-
esis would require that the impact of identiﬁcation as a local citizen is of a stronger magnitude
than identiﬁcation as a world citizen for individuals from developing countries.6
The analysis controls for several individual-level characteristics that are likely to affect
MWTP . The ﬁrst is a(n imperfect) measure of relative personal income within a country. The
survey question in WVS asks respondents for their perceived income decile, which is reported
as 1-10 in the variable incdec.7 Ex ante, higher income deciles should, on average, be more
willing to pay for environmental protection.8 All regressions were ran with non-linear income
decile effects, but no signiﬁcant non-linear effects were found. Next, to control for education,
I consider a formal measure, education (highest degree attained), and whether or not the
respondent gets information about the world from books (books = 1 if the respondent used a
book to learn about the world in the week prior to the interview). I also control for whether or
not the respondent trusts the national government (trustgov = 1 if the respondent has a “great
deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in the national government) and the respondents propensity to
support “post-material” objectives (postmaterial is an index from 1-10 composed of ranking
various national initiatives in order of importance).9 A priori, I expect that willingness to pay
for environmental protection is increasing in educational attainment, trust in the government,
and revealed post-materialistic ideals.
2.2.2 Country-level explanatory variables
At the country level, I control for the level of environmental protection, per capita income,
and the quality of democratic institutions. The Environmental Protection Index (EPI) measures
“how well countries succeed in reducing environmental stress on human health and promoting
6Should consider using interaction terms for this part of the analysis.
7Respondents were shown an income distribution chart with the average incomes for each income decile in
their country and asked in which decile their household income fell. There appears to be a systematic under-
reporting of income decile or a sampling issue (cumulatively, most countries have less than 10% reporting to be
in the top two deciles of the income distribution).
8A result derived in a theoretical companion paper [Dorsch (2011)] is that most-preferred levels of environ-
mental protection are increasing in individual income levels due to the diminishing marginal utility of consump-
tion. This is similar, in spirit, to Baumol and Oates (1979), who model environmental quality as a normal good.
9Give and example or a brief discussion of this.
6ecosystem vitality and sound natural resource management.” The index ranges between 0 and
100 and is increasing in environmental performance. I use speciﬁc components of the EPI
to control for objective measurements of local environmental quality that correspond to the
elements of environmental quality that respondents are asked about in the WVS. Speciﬁcally,
water_epi gives the percentage of the population that have access to clean drinking water,
aas_epi is the percentage of the population that has access to adequate sanitation, ebd_epi
is a measure of the population’s susceptibility to environmentally-born diseases, and up_epi
is a measure of urban air quality. Per capita GDP from 2002 is expressed in terms of PPP-
adjusted 1990 US dollars, taken from the United Nations. lgdpc is the natural logarithm of
the UN per capita GDP data. Finally, polit y is the “revised combined polity score,” a measure
of democratic institutional quality, which ranges between  10 (strongly autocratic) and 10
(strongly democratic).10 Summary statistics for all of the variables are provided in Table 1.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
To begin the analysis, I consider a series of plots, scattering country averages of the wtpinc
dependent variable against the primary country-level variables.11 In this case, the y axis
measures the proportion of respondents that are WTP (part of income or higher taxes) for
further environmental protection. In general, the scatter plots that follow indicate that there
are important country-level variations that affect individuals’ WTP .
Figure 1 plots the dependent variable averages against the log of per capita GDP . The down-
ward slope indicates that higher income countries have fewer individuals that are WTP for fur-
ther environmental protection, all else equal. The top right panel plots the dependent variable
averages against the level of environmental protection that is already in place in the country,
as measured by the composite Environmental Protection Index. The downward slope indicates
that WTP for environmental protection is diminishing on the margin.12 The bottom panels of
Figure 1 scatter the dependent variable average against sub-components of the Environmen-
tal Protection Index. The bottom left panel considers the percentage of the population that
has access to adequate sanitation. The negative slope again suggests that willingness to pay
10For the tax question, should also be considering average income tax rates and quality of ﬁscal institutions. I
thank Zach Cleary for this suggestion.
11Recall that with binary variables, the mean for the sample is equivalent to the proportion of respondents that
answered in the afﬁrmative.
12In other words, the marginal utility from environmental protection may be diminishing, which would mean
that willingness to pay for additional environmental protection should be lower for countries that have already
achieved a high level of environmental quality [Baumol and Oates (1979)].
7is diminishing on the margin, though the relation is notably weaker. The bottom right panel
considers urban air pollution, measured by particles suspended in outdoor air in micro-grams
per cubic meeter. Urban air pollution causes lower respiratory infections and cancer, so higher
numbers indicate lower environmental quality for this measure.
Table 2 presents the proportion of respondents willing to pay for further environmental
protection by country, where the countries are sorted in ascending order according to per
capita GDP . The last column presents the composite Environmental Protection Index score.
3.2 Pooled sample probit analysis
I run probit speciﬁcations on the pooled sample of individual responses with country ﬁxed ef-
fects for 24 developing countries to explain variation in the MWTP binary variables, controlling
for the individual and country-level variables described above. The baseline speciﬁcation that
I consider is the following:







where wtpij 2 f0,1g are the binary responses variable of individual i from country j,  rep-
resents the standard normal cumulative density function, Xi is a vector of individual-level
explanatory variables, Xj is a vector of country-level explanatory variables, and  and  are
vectors of coefﬁcients to be estimated using probit. The regression output in Tables 3 - 5 report
the average marginal effects for the wtpinc, wtptax, and wtpgrowth variables. The ﬁrst two
columns of each table consider the full pooled sample while the last two columns consider a
pool of only the 12 countries with the worst access to adequate sanitation (less than 75% of
the population).13 The ﬁrst (second) and third (fourth) columns of each table estimate the
WTP without (with) country ﬁxed effects.
As measures of ﬁt, the last two rows of each table report the pseudo R2 and the percentage
of within-sample predictions that the speciﬁcations get correct.14 As the tables indicate, at
least 70% of responses to the wtpinc question were correctly predicted, at least 63% of the
wtptax responses were correctly predicted, and at least 55% of the wtpgrowth responses
were correctly predicted, which gives support to the speciﬁcations, despite the relatively low
pseudo R2 statistics. As a robustness check, I also estimated the wtpinc speciﬁcations with
linear probability models, which are presented in Table 6.
13In ascending order, according to aas_epi, these countries are: Burkina Faso (13%), Ethiopia (13%), Ghana
(18%), India (33%), China (44%), Romania (51.5%), Indonesia (55%), Vietnam (61%), South Africa (65%),
Moldova (68%), Egypt (70%), Morocco (73%).
14Generally speaking, the ability to predict more than half of the binary outcomes correctly is seen as support
for the speciﬁcation.
83.3 The “objective environmental problems” explanation
One critique of the post-materialist hypothesis is that it predicts that the demand for envi-
ronmental protection should be lower in poor countries, who “cannot afford” environmental
protection due to more pressing materialistic expenditures. Ingelhart (1997) responds that
individuals in developing economies are likely to also demand for environmental protection
they face “objective environmental problems” and demand environmental protection to over-
come their objective problems, rather than to satisfy a subjective post-materialist value. An
empirical implication of the objective problems hypothesis is that individuals in developing
economies should be more likely to contribute to a local public good than to a global one. In
terms of the individual-level variables that I consider, the objective problems hypothesis implies
that the strongest determinants of MWTP should be the perceived local environmental prob-
lems, such as access to clean water (water_prob), urban air pollution (air_prob), and access
to adequate sanitation (aas_prob). Additionally, perceived environmental problems that are
regional or global [bio_prob, lake_prob, and global_prob] should have a relatively weak
effect on MWTP for environmental protection. In the three country pools considered, there is
very little support that this is the case. [JOINT F-TEST NEEDED]
For all three dependent variables (Tables 3 - 5), the perception of local environmental
problems are insigniﬁcant determinants of WTP for further environmental protection.15 In
fact, of the environmental problems considered, it is the perception that global warming is
a serious problem that has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on individuals’ MWTP . Additionally,
note that the (signiﬁcant) coefﬁcient estimates are quite similar between the whole sample and
the sub-sample of countries that faced the worst objective environmental problems. The logic
of the “objective problems” hypothesis would suggest that the countries with worse objective
problems should, on average, have MWTP that is more responsive to local problems and less
responsive to global problems.
When considering the signiﬁcant variables in the probit output, the demand for environ-
mental protection do not seem that different from rich country subjective values. Not only is
the effect of identifying oneself as a world citizen greater than the effect of identiﬁcation as
a local citizen, but the effect of world citizenship has the largest magnitude of all the deter-
minants of MWTP . For example, in model (2) from Table 3 [baseline model], a respondent
who identiﬁed themselves as a world citizen was nearly 14 percentage points more likely to be
WTP part of their income (13.5 percentage points more likely to be WTP higher taxes) on the
margin. Furthermore, the coefﬁcient on the post-materialistic ideals index is signiﬁcantly pos-
itive across speciﬁcations, suggesting that poor people also demand environmental quality for
15The only exception is the access to adequate sanitation variable in the ﬁrst column of Table 5, though this is
insigniﬁcant once the country ﬁxed effects are included.
9post-materialistic reasons. Additionally, education (especially the informal measure, books)
has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on MWTP , indicating that subjective values are important
(education should not be required for recognizing objective problems). The objective prob-
lems hypothesis, while intuitive, does not adequately explain the MWTP in these developing
countries, which seem to be explained by subjective values to a greater extent than objective
problems. Having established that subjective values are also important determinants of WTP in
developing economies, the next subsection considers whether their effects differ signiﬁcantly
from advanced economies
The quality of institutions is also an important determinant of MWTP . In the baseline speci-
ﬁcation, respondents who trusted their national government were 5.5 percentage points more
likely to be WTP part of income (not surprisingly, the coefﬁcient was higher in the WTP higher
taxes speciﬁcation) on the margin. The effect is even stronger among the 12 worst-off countries
at 10 percentage points.
As for the country-level effects, per capita GDP negatively affects MWTP . To the extent that
actual environmental protection initiatives roughly follow the development path, this is con-
sistent with a diminishing marginal utility for environmental protection. Referring to Table
4, Respondents from countries with lower access to adequate sanitation are more likely to be
WTP higher taxes on the margin. The sign on the clean water variable is not as expected, how-
ever. Interestingly, respondents from countries with more democratic political institutions were
less likely to be WTP part of their income. This could be rationalized in a similar way as the
negative coefﬁcient on GDP per capita. Along the development path for political institutions,
environmental protection improves and marginal utility declines.
3.4 Are developing economies different?
To answer this question, I add to the sample pool 14 countries listed by the IMF as advanced
economies, as well as Andorra and Cyprus, for a total of 40 countries.16 I generate an indicator
variable for whether the economy is developing (IMFdeveloping and construct interaction
terms with each of the individual-level variables considered in the previous subsection. Table 7
presents these linear probability model results.17 First of all, note that respondents from devel-
oping countries were more likely to be WTP for further environmental protection, all else equal,
than respondents from advanced economies. For example, respondents from developing coun-
tries were 28.66 percentage points more likely to be WTP part of their income (ﬁrst column of
16The advanced economies that were asked the relevant questions in the 2005-2008 WVS were South Korea,
Slovenia, Taiwan, Spain, Italy, Australia, Germany, Canada, Japan, the United States, Finland, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Norway.
17Linear probability estimations are used due to the well-known problems with using interaction terms in non-
linear models, such as probit. See Ai and Norton (2003), for example.
10results from Table 7). The interaction terms indicate how the effect of the various explanatory
variables differ for developing economies. For example, believing that global warming is a
serious problem increases the probability that a respondent is WTP part of her income by 13
percentage points in the advanced economies (coefﬁcient on globalprob), but by roughly 6
percentage points less in the developing economies (coefﬁcient on global_dev). Similarly, the
positive effect of education on WTP part of income is less in developing economies (roughly 0
on net). Moreover, there are not signiﬁcant differences between the developing and advanced
economies as concerns the effect for other “subjective values” variables. The effects of identi-
fying as a world citizen and post-material ideals as determinants of WTP part of income are
not signiﬁcantly different for developing economies (the interaction terms are insigniﬁcant).
Identiﬁcation as a local citizen does, however, have a signiﬁcantly stronger effect for devel-
oping economies. The post-materialist ideals variable does have a signiﬁcantly lower effect in
developing economies for the wtptax and wtpgrowth dependent variables, but note that the
effect of post-materialism on these dependent variables is still positive on net. Finally, for the
wtpgrowth question, identiﬁcation as a world citizen does have a signiﬁcantly lower effect
in developing economies. Overall, it seems that while one could not conclude that subjective
values are unimportant in developing economies, it is reasonable to conclude that the effect
of subjective values is of a lower magnitude in the developing world. As a robustness check,
Table 8 repeats the exercise, but uses as the indicator variable whether the country is among
the 12 worst in terms of access to adequate sanitation.
3.5 Comparison of within-country estimates
In addition to the pooled sample results, I have also preformed within-country probit esti-
mations for each of the 24 IMF developing economies in which the WTP part of income for
environmental protection question was asked in the 2005-2008 wave. The beneﬁt of such an
exercise is that we can learn how the magnitudes of the determinants of MWTP vary with
country-level characteristics, such as income level, current environmental protection and insti-
tutional quality. To this end, estimates of the marginal effects (of individual-level variables) for
each country are presented in Tables 9 and 10. In each table, if the coefﬁcient estimate was
not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, it is recorded as zero. Table 9 provides the marginal
effects estimates for the perceived environmental problems variables and the marginal effects
estimates for the other variables are in Table 10. The ﬁnal column of Table 10 provides the
predicted probability that a respondent in the median income decile, with country average
responses for all other variables, is WTP for further protection.
First of all, note that that the perceived environmental problems (Table 9) do not have
11signiﬁcant impacts on MWTP in most countries. It is the other variables in Table 10 that are
signiﬁcant determinants of MWTP in most countries. Figures 2 - 4 investigate how these co-
efﬁcient estimates vary with country level characteristics. Figure 2 shows that the effect of
identiﬁcation as a world citizen are increasing in per capita income, level of environmental
protection, and institutional quality. Figure 3 shows a similar pattern for the impact of trust in
government. Figure 4 shows how the effect of post-materialistic ideals varies across countries.
Consistent with the post-materialistic hypothesis, the effect is stronger in richer countries and
in countries with better institutions. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no relation with level of envi-
ronmental protection in place. This may indicate that utility emanating from post-materialistic
motivations may not be diminishing on the margin, suggesting a “warm-glow” source of util-
ity. [EXPAND ON THIS] Finally, Figure 5 scatters the predicted probability for the median
income decile (other variables held at country average) on the same battery of country-level
characteristics. Tables 11 - 13 regress the estimated country-level coefﬁcients (on worldcit,
postmaterial, and trustgov) on the local EPI components, controlling for development level
and polit y score. In general, the regressions indicate that the magnitude of the effect of
these post-materialist explanatory variables on WTP do not depend on local environmental
conditions.
4 Conclusion
This is a work in progress.
12Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Individual-Level Variables
wtpinc 35532 0.659 0.474 0 1
wtptax 35347 0.569 0.495 0 1
wtpgrowth 34156 0.502 0.500 0 1
water_prob 37352 0 .526 0.499 0 1
air_prob 37234 0.483 0.500 0 1
aas_prob 36843 0.524 0.499 0 1
bio_prob 34738 0.549 0.498 0 1
lake_prob 35536 0.667 0.471 0 1
global_prob 33332 0.590 0.492 0 1
incdec 36097 4.524 2.190 1 10
worldcit 35336 0.766 0.423 0 1
localcit 36671 0.454 0.498 0 1
education 37850 4.876 2.526 1 9
books 36604 0.270 0.444 0 1
trustgov 33200 0.518 0.500 0 1
postmaterial 34492 1.798 1.112 0 5
Country-Level Variables
aas_epi 38019 63.507 28/663 0 100
water_epi 38019 84.523 17.196 22 100
ebd_epi 38019 7.173 10.794 0 51
up_epi 38019 60.275 37.078 0 134.789
lgdpc 38019 7.178 0.916 5.241 8.811
polity 38019 4.282 5.965 -7 10
Notes: Calculations by the author.
13Table 2: INCOME, WTP , AND EPI SCORES FOR 24 IMF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Country 2002 GDP Mean Mean EPI
per capita WTP Income WTP Tax
Vietnam 188.80 0.963 0.908 73.91
Ethiopia 214.95 0.793 0.735 58.85
Moldova 391.66 0.648 0.552 70.74
Burkina Faso 461.76 0.805 0.753 44.34
Ghana 489.77 0.829 0.744 70.78
India 561.58 0.680 0.619 60.28
Georgia 762.03 0.781 0.470 82.18
Ukraine 932.78 0.472 0.472 74.10
Indonesia 946.63 0.722 0.590 66.19
Egypt 977.88 0.487 0.308 76.28
China 1017.73 0.824 0.737 65.08
Morocco 1323.47 0.446 0.388 72.09
Romania 1645.61 0.382 0.351 71.93
Thailand 2303.47 0.865 0.742 79.15
Bulgaria 2425.08 0.573 0.511 78.47
Poland 2505.23 0.528 0.467 80.49
Uruguay 2926.45 0.442 0.429 82.29
Turkey 3048.88 0.836 0.782 75.90
South Africa 3067.43 0.537 0.464 68.98
Brazil 3567.90 0.530 0.500 82.65
Mexico 3660.07 0.840 0.705 79.80
Malaysia 3966.54 0.619 0.533 83.98
Chile 4171.19 0.569 0.525 83.44
Trinidad 6706.43 0.747 0.593 70.36
Notes: GDP per capita is PPP-adjusted in 1990 US$, calculated by the United Nations Statistics Division.
Willingness to Pay variables are from the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, and is the
proportion of the population that agrees or strongly agrees they would pay part of their income or
higher taxes to support environmental protection. Environmental Protection Index (EPI) ranges from
0 to 100, with higher values indicating better environmental protection.
14Table 3: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WTP PART OF INCOME. PROBIT AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS
Variable 24 Dev. Econ. 24 Dev. Econ. 12 Worst 12 Worst
Individual-Level Explanatory Variables
water_prob (d) 0.0207 0.0106 0.0086 0.0068
(0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
air_prob (d) 0.0195 0.0107 0.0176 0.0083
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011)
aas_prob (d) 0.0009 -0.0020 0.0198 0.0186
(0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
bio_prob (d) 0.0260 0.0316* 0.0023 0.0037
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
lake_prob (d) -0.0349 -0.0179 -0.0073 0.0081
(0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018)
global_prob (d) 0.0609*** 0.0550*** 0.0555*** 0.0380**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
incdec 0.0089* 0.0090** 0.0075 0.0114***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
worldcit (d) 0.1504*** 0.1397*** 0.1813*** 0.1328***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.039) (0.028)
localcit (d) 0.0437** 0.0372*** 0.0287 0.0355**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
education -0.0001 0.0022 -0.0064 0.0040
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
books (d) 0.0573*** 0.0547*** 0.0766*** 0.0530***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
trustgov (d) 0.0808*** 0.0554*** 0.1316*** 0.1004***
(0.031) (0.017) (0.044) (0.011)
postmaterial 0.0213*** 0.0235*** 0.0252*** 0.0195***














N 23626 23626 12009 12009
pseudo-R2 0.040 0.073 0.058 0.133
% Correct 70.50 71.68 72.11 74.61
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1. 12 Worst refers to the 12 countries with the worst access to adequate sanitation among the 24
developing economies.
15Table 4: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WTP HIGHER TAXES. PROBIT AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS
Variable 24 Dev. Econ. 24 Dev. Econ. 12 Worst 12 Worst
Individual-Level Explanatory Variables
water_prob (d) 0.0093 -0.0061 -0.0046 -0.0116
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026)
air_prob (d) 0.0041 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0089
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015)
aas_prob (d) 0.0042 -0.0041 0.0263 0.0252
(0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021)
bio_prob (d) 0.0356** 0.0407*** 0.0128 0.0165
(0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021)
lake_prob (d) -0.0094 0.0086 -0.0166 -0.0038
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018)
global_prob (d) 0.0333 0.0285 0.0696*** 0.0511**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
incdec 0.0132*** 0.0131*** 0.0098* 0.0130***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
worldcit (d) 0.1502*** 0.1348*** 0.1850*** 0.1432***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.036) (0.019)
localcit (d) 0.0139 0.0045 0.0206 0.0220
(0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
education -0.0092* -0.0065 -0.0145* -0.0024
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
books (d) 0.0691*** 0.0671*** 0.0907*** 0.0669***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
trustgov (d) 0.0847*** 0.0616*** 0.1179*** 0.1012***
(0.029) (0.014) (0.046) (0.017)
postmaterial 0.0139* 0.0170** 0.0140* 0.0078














N 23568 23568 11986 11986
pseudo-R2 0.030 0.054 0.046 0.103
% Correct 63.33 64.17 66.14 68.78
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1. 12 Worst refers to the 12 countries with the worst access to adequate sanitation among the 24
developing economies.
16Table 5: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WTP FORGONE GROWTH. PROBIT AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS
Variable 24 Dev. Econ. 24 Dev. Econ. 12 Worst 12 Worst
Individual-Level Explanatory Variables
water_prob (d) -0.0089 -0.0040 -0.0178 -0.0205
(0.021) (0.016) (0.031) (0.023)
air_prob (d) -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0301 -0.0212
(0.022) (0.021) (0.034) (0.030)
aas_prob (d) -0.0335** -0.0219 -0.0144 0.0067
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
bio_prob (d) 0.0461** 0.0459** 0.0090 0.0059
(0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.023)
lake_prob (d) 0.0556*** 0.0517*** 0.0468* 0.0309
(0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.019)
global_prob (d) 0.0712*** 0.0733*** 0.0944*** 0.0858***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021)
incdec -0.0029 -0.0018 0.0014 0.0036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
worldcit (d) 0.0005 0.0038 -0.0124 -0.0062
(0.020) (0.017) (0.038) (0.034)
localcit (d) -0.0247* -0.0189 -0.0269 -0.0262
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
education 0.0035 0.0018 -0.0033 0.0000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
books (d) 0.0168 0.0226* 0.0295 0.0363**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015)
trustgov (d) 0.0267 -0.0023 0.0470 -0.0049
(0.026) (0.021) (0.046) (0.020)
postmaterial 0.0207*** 0.0218*** 0.0082 0.0096














N 22948 22948 11688 11688
pseudo-R2 0.016 0.028 0.012 0.039
% Correct 56.24 58.24 55.20 60.02
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1. 12 Worst refers to the 12 countries with the worst access to adequate sanitation among the 24
developing economies.
17Table 6: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WTP PART OF INCOME. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL
Variable 24 Dev. Econ. 24 Dev. Econ. 12 Worst 12 Worst
Individual-Level Explanatory Variables
water_prob (d) 0.0200 0.0121 0.0088 0.0082
(0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
air_prob (d) 0.0184 0.0111 0.0166 0.0075
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
aas_prob (d) 0.0010 -0.0021 0.0203 0.0199
(0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
bio_prob (d) 0.0262 0.0296 0.0028 0.0012
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
lake_prob (d) -0.0352 -0.0195 -0.0085 0.0067
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.017)
global_prob (d) 0.0594*** 0.0529*** 0.0526*** 0.0352**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
incdec 0.0084 0.0080* 0.0070 0.0100**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
worldcit (d) 0.1505*** 0.1368*** 0.1806*** 0.1273***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.038) (0.027)
localcit (d) 0.0424** 0.0352** 0.0276 0.0315**
(0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
education -0.0000 0.0026 -0.0061 0.0037
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
books (d) 0.0556*** 0.0524*** 0.0740*** 0.0501***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
trustgov (d) 0.0782** 0.0524*** 0.1271** 0.0927***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.043) (0.014)
postmaterial 0.0207** 0.0223*** 0.0241*** 0.0178**














N 23626 23626 12009 12009
Adjusted-R2 0.049 0.084 0.070 0.151
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1. 12 Worst refers to the 12 countries with the worst access to adequate sanitation among the 24
developing economies.
18Table 7: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WILLINGNESS TO PAY. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL
Variable Part of Income Higher Taxes Lost Growth
IMF_developing 0.2866*** 0.3315*** 0.2281***
(0.097) (0.085) (0.080)
globalprob 0.1310*** 0.1255*** 0.1525***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
global_dev -0.0623** -0.0707** -0.0378*
(0.030) (0.028) (0.020)
incdec 0.0108*** 0.0131*** 0.0089
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
incdec_dev -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0119
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
worldcit 0.1325*** 0.1116*** 0.0754**
(0.029) (0.034) (0.033)
world_dev 0.0208 0.0373 -0.0720*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.038)
localcit -0.0153 0.0033 -0.0004
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
local_dev 0.0583** 0.0106 -0.0221
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
education 0.0272*** 0.0231*** 0.0104
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
educ_dev -0.0273*** -0.0319*** -0.0072
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
books 0.0410*** 0.0308*** 0.0228**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
books_dev 0.0161 0.0378** -0.0057
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
trustgov 0.0693*** 0.1026*** 0.0312
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
trustgov_dev 0.0090 -0.0182 -0.0037
(0.035) (0.032) (0.032)
postmaterial 0.0351*** 0.0458*** 0.0660***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
post_dev -0.0150 -0.0324*** -0.0454***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
N 38822 38773 37850
Adjusted-R2 0.084 0.061 0.048
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
19Table 8: DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WILLINGNESS TO PAY. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL
Variable Part of Income Higher Taxes Lost Growth
aas_12worst 0.1304 0.1689* 0.1606**
(0.113) (0.098) (0.067)
globalprob 0.1053*** 0.0861*** 0.1403***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.013)
global_12 -0.0390 -0.0134 -0.0349
(0.035) (0.037) (0.022)
incdec 0.0097** 0.0141*** 0.0034
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
incdec_12 -0.0028 -0.0048 -0.0021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
worldcit 0.1436*** 0.1251*** 0.0532**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.023)
world_12 0.0400 0.0573 -0.0649
(0.050) (0.047) (0.042)
localcit 0.0186 0.0005 -0.0065
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
local_12 0.0088 0.0208 -0.0149
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027)
education 0.0145* 0.0084 0.0123**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
educ_12 -0.0211* -0.0224** -0.0151
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
books 0.0403*** 0.0393*** 0.0166*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
books_12 0.0352* 0.0490*** 0.0105
(0.020) (0.015) (0.025)
trustgov 0.0515*** 0.0771*** 0.0217
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
trustgov_12 0.0716 0.0371 0.0286
(0.045) (0.047) (0.049)
postmaterial 0.0239*** 0.0325*** 0.0520***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
post_12 0.0002 -0.0195* -0.0455***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
N 38822 38773 37850
Adjusted-R2 0.065 0.058 0.049
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
20Table 9: META ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS – LOCAL AND GLOBAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Country water air aas bio lakes globe
Burkina Faso 0 -0.064 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0.067 0 -0.092 0.089 0
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0
India 0 0.084 0 -0.102 0.075 0
China 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0.089 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vietnam 0.022 0.023 0 0 0 0
South Africa 0.059 0 0 0 0 0
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0.162 0
Egypt -0.115 0.223 -0.135 0.122 -0.170 -0.093
Morocco -0.249 0.200 0 0 -0.119 0
Brazil 0 -0.073 0 0.146 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0.104 0 0.142 0
Turkey 0 0 0 0.090 0 0.112
Chili 0.107 0 -0.097 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 -0.092 0.132
Ukraine 0 0 0 0.098 0.136 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0.119
Thailand 0 0 0 -0.071 0 0.062
Trinidad 0 0 0 0.083 0 0.124
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Signiﬁcant Positive 3/24 5/24 2/24 5/24 5/24 5/24
Signiﬁcant Negative 2/24 2/24 2/24 3/24 3/24 1/24
Notes: Estimated marginal effects from country-level probit regressions, with heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors. Non-zero estimates are signiﬁcant with at least 10 per cent signiﬁcance. Details of
country-level probit regressions are available on request.
21Table 10: META ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS – OTHER CHARACTERIS-
TICS AND PREDICTED FIT FOR MEDIAN INCOME DECILE
Country incdec world local educ trust post ﬁt
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.871
Ethiopia 0 -0.090 0.058 -0.017 0 -0.026 0.858
Ghana 0 0.071 -0.042 0 0 0 0.859
India 0 0.112 0 0.016 0.110 0 0.818
China 0 0 0 0 0.116 0 0.915
Romania 0.014 0.097 0.097 0.023 0 0.040 0.409
Indonesia -0.013 0 0.062 0 0.093 0.043 0.780
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.977
South Africa 0.018 0.158 0 0 0.126 0.035 0.578
Moldova 0.019 0.071 0.087 0 0 0.034 0.670
Egypt 0.030 -0.052 0 0.023 n/a 0.023 0.517
Morocco 0.040 0.306 -0.124 0.027 0 0 0.525
Brazil 0 0.108 0.086 0 0.077 0.035 0.523
Mexico 0 0.072 0 0.011 0.041 0 0.858
Poland 0 0 0 0 0.201 0 0.562
Turkey 0.013 0 0 0 0 0 0.866
Chili 0.030 0.205 0 0 0.067 0.052 0.618
Georgia 0 0.100 0 0 0 0.024 0.818
Malaysia 0 0.163 -0.081 0 -0.066 0.072 0.627
Ukraine 0.043 0.108 0 0 0.111 0.037 0.466
Bulgaria 0.050 0.114 0 0 0.116 0.057 0.670
Thailand 0 0.131 0 0 0.050 0 0.888
Trinidad 0 0.094 -0.056 0.022 0.067 0.068 0.784
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0.113 0 0.447
Signiﬁcant Positive 9/24 15/24 5/24 6/24 13/23 13/24
Signiﬁcant Negative 1/24 2/24 4/24 1/24 1/23 1/24
Greater than 0.5 21/24
Notes: Estimated marginal effects from country-level probit regressions, with heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors. Non-zero estimates are signiﬁcant with at least 10 per cent signiﬁcance. The trustgov
question was not asked in the Egyptian survey, so it was not included as a regressor in the Egyptian case.
The ﬁt column is the predicted probability that a respondent agrees with the WTP income question
assuming median income decile and country average values for all other questions. Details of country-
level probit regressions are available on request.
22Table 11: META ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
worldcit COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES – REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lgdpc 0.0325 0.0289 0.0304 0.0329 0.0389**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.017)
polity -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0018











constant -0.2399 -0.1662 -0.2092 -0.1542 -0.1170
(0.164) (0.157) (0.144) (0.166) (0.121)
N 24 24 24 24 24
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.064 0.068 0.065 0.375
Joint Sig. p value 0.248 0.239 0.230 0.237 0.006
Notes: Dependent variable is the estimated marginal effects from country-level probit regressions,
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Estimates not signiﬁcant with at least 10 per cent
signiﬁcance are entered as zero. Details of country-level probit regressions are available on request.
23Table 12: META ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
postmaterial COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES – REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lgdpc 0.0136 0.0094 0.0019 0.0031 0.0064
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
polity 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028











constant 0.0353 -0.0240 -0.0182 0.0155 -0.0126
(0.123) (0.119) (0.109) (0.125) (0.114)
N 23 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R2 -0.013 -0.044 -0.034 -0.035 -0.047
Joint Sig. p value 0.456 0.568 0.531 0.536 0.580
Notes: Dependent variable is the estimated marginal effects from country-level probit regressions,
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Estimates not signiﬁcant with at least 10 per cent
signiﬁcance are entered as zero. Details of country-level probit regressions are available on request.
24Table 13: META ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
trustgov COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES – REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lgdpc 0.0122* 0.0081 0.0096 0.0107 0.0112*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
polity 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003











constant -0.0546 -0.0492 -0.0623 -0.0564 -0.0597
(0.047) (0.045) (0.041) (0.048) (0.042)
N 24 24 24 24 24
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.123 0.113 0.106 0.106
Joint Sig. p value 0.157 0.136 0.150 0.160 0.161
Notes: Dependent variable is the estimated marginal effects from country-level probit regressions,
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Estimates not signiﬁcant with at least 10 per cent
signiﬁcance are entered as zero. Details of country-level probit regressions are available on request.
25Figure 1: Proportion of individuals willing to pay part of income for further environmental
protection scattered against country-level measurements for 24 developing economies. Top
left: log of per capita GDP (R2 = 0.135); top right: Environmental Protection Index (R2 =
0.083); bottom left: percentage with access to adequate sanitation (R2 = 0.067); bottom
right: measure of urban air pollution (R2 = 0.045).
26Figure 2: Estimated Coefﬁcient on World Citizenship Identiﬁer scattered against (i) Log of Per
Capita Income (R2 = 0.172), (ii) Environmental Protection Index (R2 = 0.101), (iii) Polity
Score (R2 = 0.035), and (iv) Functioning of Government Score (R2 = 0.057).
27Figure 3: Estimated Coefﬁcient on Trust in Government Indicator scattered against (i) Log of
Per Capita Income (R2 = 0.218), (ii) Environmental Protection Index (R2 = 0.049), (iii) Polity
Score (R2 = 0.087), and (iv) Functioning of Government Score (R2 = 0.044).
28Figure 4: Estimated Coefﬁcient on Post Materialism Index scattered against (i) Log of Per
Capita Income (R2 = 0.087), (ii) Environmental Protection Index (R2 = 0.000), (iii) Polity
Score (R2 = 0.088), and (iv) Functioning of Government Score (R2 = 0.162).
29Figure 5: Estimated Fit for WTP Income for the Median Income Decile scattered against (i)
Log of Per Capita Income (R2 = 0.153), (ii) Environmental Protection Index (R2 = 0.147), (iii)
Polity Score (R2 = 0.052), and (iv) Functioning of Government Score (R2 = 0.089).
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